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LEARNING TOGETHER: JUSTICE MARSHALL'S
DESEGREGATION OPINIONS
MARIA L MARCUS*
In this Article, Professor Marcus examines the influence of Justice Thurgood
Marshall on the Supreme Court's current school desegregation agenda. Justice
Marshall was part of the majority in desegregation cases during his earlier years
on the high Court subsequently, however, his role became one of dissenter. Pro-
fessor Marcus analyzes the divisive issues facing the Court in desegregation litiga-
tion, Marshall's positions on such issues, and his legacy to the Court in this area.
Finally, the Article assesses the vitality of this legacy in light of two Supreme
Court decisions issued after Justice Marshall's retirement.
INTRODUCTION
Our Nation, I fear, will be ill served by the Court's refusal to
remedy separate and unequal education, for unless our children
begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will
ever learn to live together.
Justice Thurgood Marshall "
At some time, we must acknowledge that it has become absurd to
assume ... that violations of the Constitution dating from the
days when Lyndon Johnson was President... continue to have
an appreciable effect on current operation of schook We are
close to that time.
Justice Antonin Scalia***
A S the advocate in Brown v. Board of Education,' Thurgood Mar-
Y hall's unsentimental probing exposed the rationalizations support-
ing racial segregation.2 His appointment to the high Court reflected the
* Professor of Law, Fordhan University School of Law; B.A. 1954, Oberlin Col-
lege; J.D. 1957, Yale University; Associate Counsel, NAACP, 1961-1967. The author
acknowledges with gratitude the valuable research assistance of Kevin N. Ainsworth and
Robert C. Cooper.
** Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
o Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1453 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
2. Brown's impact was cumulative. Judge Constance Baker Motley of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York observes: "In the decade
which followed the Brown I decision.. . the Supreme Court struck down racial segrega-
tion in all other areas of... public life .... Even the high [C]ourt seemed to realize that
desegregated schools could not coexist with segregated... lunch counters." Constance
Baker Motley, Remarks at Brown v. Board of Education and Its Legacy: A Tribute to
Justice Thurgood Marshall 20 (Mar. 24, 1992) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law
Review) (article based on speech included in this issue of the Fordham Law Review).
Judge Louis H. Pollak, United States District Court Judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, discussing the impact of Brown on cases involving voting, criminal proce-
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public consensus that emerged from Brown's optimistic espousal of mi-
nority rights. However, once appointed Marshall was one Justice out of
nine, with intimate access to colleagues who by no means shared all his
values.
Despite his expertise in desegregation matters, he authored very few
opinions on the subject. Marshall did not have the option of assigning
himself majority opinions that he deemed important. Majority decisions
are given out by the Chief Justice, or by the senior Associate Justice of
the majority block when the Chief Justice dissents.' Assignment consid-
erations include the importance of the case,4 the ability to win over possi-
ble defectors,' and "the public relations aspect of a decision expected to
be unpopular." 6 Politically-motivated assignments are given to the Jus-
tice closest to the constituency that may be offended. For example, Mar-
shall became the Court's representative in a decision proclaiming that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination against
Whites in the workplace "to the same extent it prohibits racial discrimi-
nation against [B]lacks." 7
Marshall's sole avenue of expression in desegregation cases was to
write dissents and concurrences. Part I of this Article presents a brief
overview of his initial participation in the mainstream and subsequent
dissents. Part II analyzes the issues that particularly challenged Mar-
shall: the injured and the uninvolved innocent; integration or equalized
separation; causation and demography. In Part III, his influence is
traced through developments after his retirement. This Article
dure, gender discrimination, freedom of speech, and international law, concludes:
"Brown, in short.... was a decision whose limits we do not yet know." Louis H. Pollak,
Remarks at Brown v. Board of Education and Its Legacy: A Tribute to Justice Thurgood
Marshall 47 (Mar. 24, 1992) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review) (article
based on speech included in this issue of the Fordham Law Review).
3. See Joseph F. Menez, Decision Making in the Supreme Court of the United States
61-62 (1984); Harold J. Spaeth, Distributive Justice: Majority Opinion Assignments in the
Burger Court, in Studies in U.S. Supreme Court Behavior 80, 81 (Harold J. Spaeth & Saul
Brenner eds., 1990).
4. "[T]he Chief Justice is expected to write [a landmark decision] and thus throw the
weight of the Court behind it." Menez, supra note 3, at 61. See also Charles M. Lamb,
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: A Conservative Chief for Conservative Times, in The
Burger Court: Political and Judicial Profiles 129, 148-49 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen
C. Halpern eds., 1991) (hypothesizing that Chief Justice Burger assigned himself the
opinion in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), to assert his
leadership, and explaining that he self-assigned Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974),
because of his reservations about busing).
5. See Menez, supra note 3, at 65 (discussing the strategy for assigning opinions);
Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme Court-A Judicial Biog-
raphy 704 (1983) (stating that Chief Justice Warren assigned Brennan the majority opin-
ion in Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), in hopes of winning Black's vote
and achieving a unanimous decision); Spaeth, supra note 3, at 81-82 (emphasizing that
the author of a majority opinion must satisfy the views of at least four other Justices).
6. Spaeth, supra note 3, at 81.
7. Menez, supra note 3, at 63 (referring to McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273 (1976)).
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presumptuously offers a dissent that he might have written in one of
these cases had he remained on the Court.
I. FROM MAINSTREAM TO DISSENT: AN OVERVIEW
A. Marshall in the Majority
In the thirteen years between Thurgood Marshall's successful advo-
cacy in Brown I and his appointment as a Justice of the Supreme Court in
1967, the Warren Court's "all deliberate speed" formula for desegrega-
tion began to falter.' Local school officials, whose "good faith" conver-
sion to non-discriminatory policies had been invoked by Brown v. Board
of Education,9 predictably stalled instead of speeding.' ° Nor did the lo-
cal judges who were supervising the process accelerate the pace. As one
Mississippi attorney put it, "We couldn't ask for anything better than to
have our local, native Mississippi federal district judges [reviewing the
desegregation problem] .... Our... judges know the local situation and
it may be 100 years before it's feasible.""
In 1968, in an opinion joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan sig-
nalled that the Court would grant no further adjournments. Green v.
County School Board 2 required that the board "come forward with a
plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to
work now."' 3 Green involved the school system of New Kent, a rural
Virginia county with no residential segregation and only two schools-
one all-White, and the other all-Negro.' 4 After a desegregation suit was
8. This formula, introduced in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301
(1955) (Brown I), was found wanting in Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218,
234 (1964). Griffin acknowledged that "[t]here has been entirely too much deliberation
and not enough speed." Id. at 229. "The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out, and
that phrase can no longer justify denying these... children their constitutional rights to
an education equal to that afforded by the public schools .... " Id. at 234.
9. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I1). Brown II initially confided to school boards the
task of devising procedures for admitting Blacks to formerly White schools on a non-
discriminatory basis. See id. at 299. Local courts were to "consider whether the action of
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional
principles." Id
10. See, eg., J. Harvie Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and
School Integration: 1954-1978, at 78-79 (1979). Discussing southern resistance to deseg-
regation and the Supreme Court's failure to grapple with it in the 1950s and early 1960s,
Wilkinson states:
[T]he Court ducked a leading role by refusing even to review most rulings of the
lower federal courts. The Court spoke mainly when it absolutely had to: at the
point of crisis when obstruction was so apparent, delay so prolonged, or viola-
tion of constitutional principle so manifest that quiet was no longer feasible.
Id. at 79.
11. Reed Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation 200 (1966). But see Wilkinson, supra
note 10, at 75, 77 (discussing the advantages of the "all deliberate speed formula" as an
alternative to massive resistance, as well as the errors made in implementing and moni-
toring the formula).
12. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
13. Id. at 439.
14. See id at 432. Twenty-one school buses travelled overlapping routes to transport
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filed on behalf of Black students, the board's concern about remaining
eligible for federal financial aid led to adoption of a "freedom of choice"
plan that permitted pupils to choose annually between the two schools. 15
In rejecting the plan as ineffectual, the Court emphasized that the board,
not the children and their parents, had the burden of dismantling the de
jure dual system 16 and that geographic zoning could "readily" accom-
plish this goal. 1"
Justice Marshall was also in accord with two significant follow-up
opinions, Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education,'8 and Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.'9 Alexander held per
curiam that the "all deliberate speed" standard was no longer constitu-
tionally permissible, substituting instead "at once," "now," and "imme-
diately" as the operative terms.2 ° Swann, written on behalf of a
unanimous Court by Chief Justice Burger, disclaimed any requirement
that desegregated schools "must always reflect the racial composition of
the ... system as a whole."'" Nevertheless, "when local authority de-
faults,",2 2 the courts may then mandate remedies that are "administra-
tively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre, in some situations ' 2 3 in
pupils to these segregated enclaves. See id. Racial segregation was initially mandated
under Virginia's constitutional and statutory provisions which were struck down by the
Supreme Court in Davis v. County School Board, 347 U.S. 483, 487 n. 1 (1954), a compan-
ion case to Brown L The State's enactment of further segregation statutes after Brown is
described in Green, 391 U.S. at 432.
15. Green, 391 U.S. at 433-34. The plan established that "every student, regardless of
race, may 'freely' choose the school he will attend." Id. at 437. Those students who
made no choice were assigned to the school previously attended. See id. at 434. After
three years, however, no White students switched schools, and only 15% of the Negro
students did; thus, "[t]he school system [remained] a dual system." Id. at 441.
16. See id. at 441-42.
17. See id. at 442 n.6. The Supreme Court vacated the decision below insofar as it
affirmed the district court's acceptance of the "freedom of choice" plan under the facts in
the case. See id. at 442.
18. 396 U.S. 19 (1969) (per curiam).
19. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
20. Alexander, 396 U.S. at 20. In a per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the lower
court decision and remanded with instructions that jurisdiction be retained "to insure
prompt and faithful compliance." Id. at 20-21.
21. Swann, 402 U.S. at 24.
22. Id. at 16.
23. Id. at 28. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system encompassed 550 square
miles and served more than 84,000 students in 107 schools. See id. at 6. In June of 1969,
approximately 14,000 of 21,000 Negro students in the City of Charlotte attended 21
schools that were more than 99% Negro. See id. at 7.
The Court found that the school board's actions had caused this segregated education.
See idt Moreover, the "assignment of children to the school nearest their home... would
not produce an effective dismantling of the dual [school] system." Id. at 30.
Describing the nature of bus transportation as "an integral part of the public education
system for years," id. at 29, the Court approved a plan that called for students to be
transported from the schools nearest their homes to the schools they would attend. In
total, "[tihe trips for elementary school pupils average about seven miles and ... would
take 'not over 35 minutes at the most.'" Id. at 30 (quoting the district court's findings).
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order to eliminate "all vestiges of state-imposed segregation."24
As a circuit justice, Marshall cited Alexander in his sardonic denial of
a stay application by the Jefferson Parish School Board:25
The schools involved have been mired in litigation for seven years.
Whatever progress toward desegregation has been made apparently,
and unfortunately, derives only from judicial action initiated by those
persons situated as perpetual plaintiffs below. The rights of children to
equal educational opportunities are not to be denied, even for a brief
time, simply because a school board situates itself so as to make deseg-
regation difficult.
26
B. Marshall as Dissenter: Four Opinions
In a memorandum drafted while he was a law clerk to Supreme Court
Justice Robert Jackson, William Rehnquist said:
To the argument made by Thurgood not John Marshall that a majority
may not deprive a minority of its constitutional right, the answer must
be made that while this is sound in theory, in the long run it is the
majority who will determine what the constitutional rights of the mi-
nority are."
This statement is remarkable for its literal truth; for the consciousness
of power that underlies it; for the fortuity of comparing a man who
would later be a Supreme Court Justice with a predecessor of the same
name. It also poses starkly the dilemma and frustration of the dissenter
whose constitutional interpretations are becoming less influential.
1. Milliken and Geography (1974)
Prior to 1974, Marshall approved the Court's direction, although he
was not always in accord with each member's approach to unravelling
24. Id. at 15.
25. See Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd. v. Dandridge, 404 U.S. 1219, 1220 (1971). The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana had ordered the board
to implement a desegregation plan. Justice Marshall recognized that implementation
would lead to "difficulties normally incident to the transition from a dual to a unitary
school system," id. at 1219, but denied a stay.
26. Id. at 1220.
27. Mark V. Tushnet, with Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board
of Education, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1867, 1910 (1991) (discussing the testimony of the Hon.
William H. Rehnquist during hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Rehn-
quist's nomination as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court). The memoran-
dum, written while the Supreme Court Justices were engaged in their Brown
deliberations, was entitled "A Random Thought on the Segregation Cases." Rehnquist
later explained that this memorandum was written at Justice Jackson's request as a rough
draft of Jackson's views. See 2 Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v.
Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality 767-68 n.0 (1975). See
also Tushnet, with Lezin, supra, at 1878-80 (discussing the extent to which the memoran-
dum reflected Jackson's opinions). Professor Tushnet concludes that "[h]owever humane
and libertarian he was, Jackson was deeply ambivalent about the question of race." Id. at
1880.
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the administrative tangles of desegregation.2" However, his disagreement
with the majority's rejection of an inter-district remedy in Milliken v.
Bradley29 became the first of several comprehensive dissents in school
cases.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Milliken majoritya° moved the
Court away from Swann's emphasis on correcting historical and institu-
tional injustice, and instead parsed the actions of particular wrongdoers
who had injured particular victims. Burger reasoned that federal courts
should not solve a Detroit segregation problem by imposing an area-wide
remedy which included suburban school districts that had not engaged in
segregative acts. 31 Since intentional discrimination against Negro stu-
dents had occurred only within the Detroit school system, the remedy
must be confined to that system.32
The majority chided the courts below for shifting their focus to the
metropolitan area "only because of their conclusion that total desegrega-
tion of Detroit would not produce the racial balance which they per-
ceived as desirable" 33-a balancing act that was not required under the
Constitution. 34 Moreover, school district lines could not be "casually ig-
nored," in view of the deeply rooted tradition of local control over the
operation of public schools.35
Justice Marshall, representing a panel of four dissenters,36 bitterly de-
nounced the Court's "giant step backwards. ' 37 His opinion, which will
28. See generally Carter v. West Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970) (per
curiam) (reversing lower court judgments that permitted delays in implementing desegre-
gation). A concurring opinion by Justice Harlan, joined by Justice White, concluded that
"the time from the finding of noncompliance with the requirements of the Green case to
the time of the actual operative effiect of the relief [should not exceed] approximately eight
weeks." Id. at 293.
Justice Marshall joined Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan in a statement noting
their disagreement with this concurring opinion, and emphasizing that "those views re-
treat from our holding in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education ... that 'the
obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to
operate now and hereafter only unitary schools.'" Id. (citation omitted).
29. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken 1).
30. The Chief Justice was joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehn-
quist. See id,
31. See id. at 744-45.
32. See id. at 745.
33. Id. at 739-40.
34. See discussion of Swann, supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
35. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) (Milliken 1).
36. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and White joined Marshall's opinion. Justice Douglas
also filed a separate dissent, pointing out: "Education in Michigan is a state project with
very little completely local control .... [T]he school districts by state law are agencies of
the State." Id. at 758-59 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Yet another dissent issued by Justice
White and joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall concluded that "until now
the Court has not accepted the proposition that effective enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment could be limited by political or administrative boundary lines demarcated by
the very State responsible for the constitutional violation and for the disestablishment of
the dual system." Id. at 776 (White, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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be more fully explored in Part II of this Article, unfurled a critique of the
majority's methodology and assumptions. It was not just the Detroit
Board of Education's purposeful use of attendance lines, school construc-
tion, feeder patterns and busing that had confined Black children to "an
expanding core of virtually all-Negro schools immediately surrounded by
a receding band of all-white schools.""8 It was also the State of Michigan
that had contributed to this pattern by passing legislation prohibiting im-
plementation of a 1970 desegregation plan proposed by the Detroit
School Board; refusing transportation aid for Detroit pupils while sup-
plying it for other areas, necessitating the construction of small walk-in
schools in Detroit's segregated neighborhoods; and finally permitting
transportation funds to be allocated for intra-city travel, but not if such
travel involved cross-busing to end racial segregation.39
Nor was Detroit's school district line a sacrosanct product of local
control over education. Marshall pointed out that unlike other states,
Michigan operated a single state-wide system of education with suburban
and city school districts as auxiliaries that had little or no relation to
local political units." The State retained full authority to consolidate
and merge school districts without the consent of such districts or their
citizens.4 Thus, the state government was neither innocent of the
wrongdoing nor powerless to end it.42
2. Spangler and Demography (1976)
The next occasion for a dissenting opinion by Justice Marshall con-
cerned federal authority to prevent resegregation in a district that was
undergoing population changes. In Pasadena City Board of Education v.
Spangler,43 school officials requested deletion of a district court require-
ment that no Pasadena public schools should have "'a majority of any
38. Id at 785.
39. See id at 791. The record also indicated that during the 1950s, Black high school
students from outside Detroit were bused past a closer suburban White school to a more
distant Negro school in Detroit, and that the State Board of Education knew about this
arrangement. See id at 792.
40. See id at 793-94.
41. See id at 796. Marshall pointed out that the State controlled the financing of
education via statewide taxation and power over equalized property valuations. Further-
more, the State approved bus routes, equipment, and drivers, determined part of the re-
quired curriculum, and established procedures for student discipline. See id. at 794-96.
42. At least two methods were available to end the segregation. The State had the
power to consolidate districts; over 1000 consolidations had already taken place. See id.
at 811. Short of consolidation, the State could authorize inter-district contracting for
education services; public funds could be used to pay one district to educate another
district's residents. See id at 811-12. As to the feasibility of busing, see infra notes 100-
01 and accompanying text.
43. 427 U.S. 424 (1976). In January, 1970, the district court concluded that the
Pasadena Board of Education's policies were segregative. Rather than appeal, the board
submitted a desegregation plan. In March, 1970 the district court approved the
"Pasadena Plan," but in 1974, the board sought relief from the 1970 order. See id. at
427-35.
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minority students.' ,44Rehnquist, who was joined by five other Justices,
granted this restriction on the lower court's power. The majority found
that although changing residential patterns had caused Black enrollment
to exceed fifty percent at some schools, these demographic shifts were not
the result of "segregative actions" on the petitioners' part.45
The dissent made no claim that redrawing of attendance lines could be
required in perpetuity.46 However, present circumstances signalled a
need for vigilance. Several members of the Pasadena Board of Education
had consistently opposed the court-approved desegregation plan 47 and
the board had presented an alternative plan that would probably have
resulted in "rapid resegregation." 48 Thus, the dangers that formed the
basis for the original finding of unconstitutional conduct had not dimin-
ished enough to justify a change in the level of judicial supervision.49
3. Crawford and Ballots (1982)
Judicial authority to alleviate segregation was again at issue in Craw-
ford v. Board ofEducation,50 but with a special twist. The voters of Cali-
fornia had ratified an amendment (Proposition I) to the state
constitution 51 that precluded state courts from ordering mandatory pupil
assignment or transportation unless a violation of the United States Con-
stitution had occurred.52 Justice Powell's majority opinion noted that
repeal of an existing state anti-discrimination measure does not in itself
44. Id. at 428 (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 505
(C.D. Cal. 1970)).
45. See id. at 435-36.
46. See id. at 444 n. 1.
47. See id. at 442.
48. Id. at 442 (quoting with approval the view of a member of the panel of the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit below, in Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 519
F.2d 430, 435 (9th Cir. 1975)).
49. See id. at 442-43. The Court did not reach the question of whether a total with-
drawal of federal supervision would be appropriate. But see infra Parts II.C. and III.A.
50. 458 U.S. 527 (1982). In 1978, a California trial court ordered desegregation
through pupil reassignment and transportation. See id. at 531. In 1979, California
amended its constitution (Proposition I) to prohibit state courts from ordering student
reassignment and busing without a finding of de jure segregation in violation of the
United States Constitution. The school district challenged the prior desegregation order;
the trial court held that Proposition I did not apply because it had found de jure segrega-
tion in 1970.
Justice Rehnquist, as circuit justice, denied a stay because "a stay granted less than a
week before the scheduled opening of school ... would not be a proper exercise of my
function as a circuit justice, even though were I voting on the merits of a petition for
certiorari challenging the plan I would, as presently advised, feel differently." Board of
Educ. v. Superior Court, 448 U.S. 1343, 1349 (1980). The school district appealed the
trial court's decision; the California Court of Appeals reversed; and the California
Supreme Court denied a hearing.
51. The amendment was a proviso to article I, section 7(a) of the California Constitu-
tion. The constitution had previously been interpreted as mandating the elimination of
segregation regardless of its cause. See discussion infra note 61.
52. Proposition I did not prohibit voluntary action by school boards to implement
"integration." See Cal. Const. art. I, § 7(a).
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violate the Fourteenth Amendment-the people can give, and the people
can rescind.5 3
While acknowledging that "court-ordered busing in excess of that re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment, as one means of desegregating
schools, prompted the initiation and probably the adoption of Proposi-
tion , M the majority accepted the California Court of Appeals conclu-
sion that the voters "were not motivated by a discriminatory purpose.""
A desire for the educational benefits of neighborhood schools is racially
neutral.
56
Justice Marshall's dissent, which was not joined by any of his col-
leagues, found the case indistinguishable from a companion decision,
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.5' In Seattle, a voter initiative
had precluded school boards from ordering mandatory school assign-
ments except to remedy de jure segregation. This initiative had unconsti-
tutionally differentiated between those seeking to eradicate de facto
segregation and others seeking non-racial educational goals (e.g., we
want more gym equipment); only the former had to appeal to more re-
mote entities like the state legislature rather than to local school
boards. Marshall noted that California's Proposition I similarly re-
moved an avenue for obtaining compliance 9 with the state constitution's
guarantee that racial isolation will be alleviated by all reasonable
means. 6' That avenue-the judiciary-is "the only branch of govern-
ment that has been willing to address this issue meaningfully."96 1
53. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 538-39.
54. Id at 538 n.18.
55. Id at 545.
56. See id. at 543. Justice Brennan, rather than join the dissent, signed on to a con-
currence by Justice Blackmun that strenuously sought to distinguish the case at bar from
a companion decision, Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
Seattle struck down a voter initiative in the State of Washington that prevented school
boards from ordering mandatory school assignments without a finding of dejure segrega-
tion. This initiative was unconstitutional, the concurrence concluded, because it effected
a structural change in the political process, thereby ..' "mak[ing] it more difficult for
certain racial ... minorities [than for other members of the community] to achieve legis-
lation that is in their interest." '" Crawford, 458 U.S. at 546 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(second alteration in original) (quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 470; in turn quoting Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 395 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)). In Crawford, however,
"those political mechanisms that create and repeal the rights ultimately enforced by the
courts were left entirely unaffected." Id. at 547.
57. 458 U.S. 457 (1982). See supra note 56.
58. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 553 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing Seattle).
59. See id at 555. Prior to the passage of Proposition I, the minority community
could ask the school board to eliminate racial segregation, and if that failed, could peti-
tion the state courts "to require school officials to live up to their obligations." Id.
60. See id at 549.
61. Id at 561. The application of the state constitution's equal protection and due
process clauses to de facto segregation had been established by a unanimous California
Supreme Court decision, Jackson v. Pasadena City School District, 382 P.2d 878, 881-82
(1963). Even though the source of judicial power to prevent unconstitutional conduct
may be "the people," this power cannot be granted on a discriminatory basis. See Craw-
ford, 458 U.S. at 558 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out the repeated
1992]
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4. Dowell and Disengagement (1991)
Marshall recognized that the Court's jurisprudence had vacillated for
more than a decade between demanding "root and branch" elimination
of segregation 62 and denouncing "judicial tutelage for the indefinite fu-
ture.",63 His last school-case dissent, in Board of Education of Oklahoma
City v. Dowell,' offered a blueprint for deciding when a desegregation
decree should be terminated.
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that
such a decree, unlike injunctions in other contexts, should be dissolved
when the purpose of the litigation has been achieved. To say that this
purpose is the establishment of a "unitary" school district 66 does not
attempts prior to Proposition I to stop California courts and school boards from enforc-
ing the state constitution's demand that de facto segregation be combatted by all feasible
means. The question of whether Proposition I was motivated by discriminatory intent
should have been decided after an inquiry, rather than mere conclusory statements by the
lower courts. See id. at 561-62.
62. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). Other decisions also
expressing this view, which Justice Marshall joined, were issued in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486 (1982); Co-
lumbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979).
63. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 638 (1991). Dowell was presaged by
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), discussed supra at
Part I.B.2, although the Spangler majority did not reach the question of whether a total
withdrawal of federal supervision was warranted by the facts. The circuit court on re-
mand, however, noted "the Board's present compliance and its representations that it
would continue to engage in affirmative action ... in support of integration" and ordered
termination of judicial control. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239,
1241-42 (9th Cir. 1979).
64. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
65. See id. at 636-37. The Court found that the Tenth Circuit's test for dissolving a
desegregation decree, evolved from restraint of trade cases, was too stringent. That test
would continue an injunction unless there was a showing of" 'grievous wrong evoked by
new and unforeseen conditions.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S.
106, 119 (1932), overruled by Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991)). In deseg-
regation cases, local control over education (which permits innovation) requires a more
flexible standard. The Dowell majority remanded the case to the district court to deter-
mine whether the vestiges of past intentional discrimination had been eliminated to the
extent practicable. See id. at 638.
66. Courts have used the word "dual" to mean a school system that intentionally
segregates students by race and "unitary" to signify a school system "which has been
brought into compliance with... the Constitution." Id. at 636.
In 1977, the district court concluded that the school board was in "substantial compli-
ance" with constitutional requirements. It held further that "the board is entitled to
pursue ... its legitimate policies without the... supervision of this court." Id. at 633-34.
In 1985, on motion, the district court made a finding that the school system was inte-
grated and nondiscriminatory, and refused to reopen the case. The court of appeals re-
versed, holding that although the district court had ceased active supervision of the case,
"the school district was still subject to the desegregation decree." Id. at 634. Therefore,
the respondents could challenge the school board's actions. See id.
On remand, the district court vacated the previous injunction, finding that present resi-
dential segregation arose from private decisionmaking and economics, and not from
school board policy. See id. at 634-35. The court of appeals again reversed. It held that
"the Board had the ' "affirmative duty.., not to take any action that would impede the
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yield the "precise" statement of duties that a school board needs.6' The
decree can be lifted when local authorities have obeyed it for a reasonable
period of time.68 The majority remanded the case to the district court
with instructions to review the school board's performance in every cate-
gory of school operations,69 but added no precision as to how complete
and effective the compliance in these categories must be.' 0
The dissent, which urged restoration of the injunction, highlighted the-
ories that will be examined more fully in Part II of this Article. Marshall
formulated the questions that should be considered before federal with-
drawal from a school case, and politely told the majority how these ques-
tions should have been answered. Is the school district committed to the
establishment of an integrated system? (No, because the board at first
exploited residential segregation to enforce school segregation, 71 and
later used student reassignments to undercut a court-ordered desegrega-
tion plan).72 Will the approach favored by the board foster lasting inte-
gration which, in turn, could produce quality education? (No, mostly-
White and mostly-Black schools have re-emerged, and this shift will gen-
erally be accompanied by the assignment of fewer resources and worse
teachers to Black children). 3
Marshall also emphasized feasibility. Has the board justified its failure
to use an available and more effective desegregation plan? (No, the
board's past actions have increased racial isolation in schools and per-
haps also in residential patterns, and therefore all reasonable measures
must be taken to give "make whole" relief). 7'4 Are the educational bene-
process of disestablishing the dual system and its effects."' " Id. at 635 (quoting Dowell
v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1504 (10th Cir. 1989); in turn quoting Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979)).
67. See id at 636.
68. See id at 637.
69. See id at 638.
70. A school board's profession that discrimination will cease would be insufficient,
but good faith, as evidenced by conduct, is relevant. See id. at 637.
71. See id at 639-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent, joined by Justices Black-
mun and Stevens, noted that racially-restrictive covenants buttressed by state and local
law created a segregated residential pattern in Oklahoma City, and that the school board
located all-Negro schools in the largest segregated area. See id.
72. See id at 640. The board had displayed "'unpardonable recalcitrance.'" Id.
(quoting from the district court opinion, 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1271 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd,
465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972), ordering implementation of
a desegregation plan evolved by plaintiffs' expert (the "Finger Plan")). The board had
not offered any effective plan of its own, arguing that "public opinion [was] opposed to
any further desegregation." Id (alteration in original). After the board had complied
with the Finger Plan for five years, the district court ceased its active supervision of the
case but did not dissolve the desegregation injunction. See id. at 640-41. In 1985, the
board superimposed a new assignment policy that caused racial imbalance to resurface.
As a result, the majority of the elementary schools had student bodies greater than 90%
Black or 90% White and certain other minorities. See id. at 641.
73. See id at 642-43 & n.5; see also infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (noting
that Black schools receive inferior resources).
74. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 645-46 & n.8. (1991). The reci-
procity between school and housing segregation is discussed infra at notes 91-92 and
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fits flowing from continuation of an injunction outclassed by the benefits
of local control over education? (No, retaining a decree that does not
entail a return to active supervision is a light burden when compared to
the stigmatizing effect of segregated schooling)."
II. DEFINING THE INJURY, CRAFTING THE REMEDY, AND
DECLARING VICTORY: JUSTICE MARSHALL'S QUARREL
WITH THE MAJORITY
As the Supreme Court developed narrower concepts of harm and cau-
sation to support federal withdrawal from desegregation conflicts, Justice
Marshall honed his counter-arguments. Puncturing perceived inconsis-
tencies, and prominently displaying evidence that his colleagues failed to
mention, he predicted that allowing racial isolation in public schools
would have broader consequences that the people "will ultimately
regret."
76
A. Who's Hurt, and Who's Innocent?
Conceptions of injury and innocence in Milliken v. Bradley""
presented embarrassing features for both the majority and the dissent.
For the majority, the difficulty was the admitted injury left unredressed.
The Court's self-described mandate was to "restore the victims of dis-
criminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the ab-
sence of such conduct."7 Yet, after assuming arguendo that several
state agencies participated in the maintenance of Detroit's segregation,79
Chief Justice Burger left Black children in a school system characterized
by increasing racial isolation.80 The harm, he emphasized, had occurred
in Detroit-a point that had not only geographical but moral
ramifications.
Ascending to the higher ground of innocence, the majority held that
suburban school districts had not manipulated boundary lines, nor com-
mitted acts that fostered segregation."1 This fact effectively protected
them from the punishment of involvement in an inter-district remedy. A
period when suburban Negro students were bused past a White suburban
school to a more distant Black school in Detroit was dismissed as an
accompanying text. The dissent cites "magnet" schools as an example of educational
innovation that could have been used to benefit all Oklahoma City school children. See
id. at 646 n.9.
75. See id. at 648.
76. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 815 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Milliken
).
77. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken 1). See supra Part I.B.1.
78. Id. at 746.
79. See id.
80. See generally Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (the Court reversed the
decision of the court of appeals which had affirmed the relief granted by the district
court).
81. See id. at 748.
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"isolated" occurrence.8 2 The constitutional wrong had not involved the
suburbs, and suburban authorities had no duty to correct it.
While reaffirming the propriety of "a balancing of the individual and
collective interests,"8 " the Chief Justice did not balance injury and inno-
cence against each other. The opinion avoided weighing the disadvan-
tages for Black children who remained in racially isolated schools against
the disadvantages of pairing such schools with nearby White schools on
the other side of the presently-drawn district line. Rather, it cited a laun-
dry list of tax and administrative problems arising out of inter-district
relief'-problems that had obviously been solved in the thousands of
school district consolidations that had taken place in Michigan. 5
The Court reasoned that although "'[s]eparate educational facilities
are inherently unequal,' "86 the remedy could nevertheless be restricted
because it must be determined by " 'the nature of the violation.' "87 This
rubric permitted the injury flowing from racially-separate schools to con-
tinue because the "nature" of the infringement could be fragmented: the
site selections of an urban school board, the enactments of a distant state
legislature, the isolated suburban act of discrimination. Under such an
approach, the effect of the violation recedes into the background.
For Marshall, the injury point was easy. The dissent kept the impact
of racial isolation in the foreground, underlining the frustration of chil-
dren who have been denied "an equal opportunity to reach their full po-
tential as citizens."8 8  He noted that after years of stigmatizing
confinement to all-Negro schools surrounded by all-White schools, these
children would not be comforted by the fact that the barrier between the
races was now a school district boundary. 9 The nature of the violation
"was not some defacto racial imbalance, but... intentional, massive, de
jure segregation."'9
82. See id at 750.
83. Id at 738 (citing with approval from Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
84. See id. at 743.
85. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing consolidation and other
methods of inter-district cooperation).
86. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737 (1974) (Milliken 1) (quoting the seminal
statement in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)).
87. Id at 738 (quoting with approval Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
88. Id. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. See id at 805. Although the Detroit metropolitan area is perceived by its resi-
dents as one unit, with suburbanites working in the city (and many city dwellers em-
ployed in the suburbs), the city schools would remain racially identifiable and in sharp
contrast to neighboring schools in the metropolitan community. See id. at 804.
90. Id. at 785. See discussion supra Part I.B.I. Justice Marshall's opinions did not
call for "racial balancing," i.e. mandatory federal remedies in situations where govern-
ment-supported discrimination had no impact. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 803. See also
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 444 n.l (1976) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (disapproving the view that continuous redistricting can be required even after a
desegregation plan has been implemented and the effects of discrimination eliminated).
1992]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The question of suburban innocence was more problematic. All-White
suburbs had no students to segregate, and had not drawn segregative dis-
trict lines. The dissent met these points by describing the State's role in
accelerating the development of White enclaves outside the inner-city
limits. The placement of schools influences the development of metro-
politan housing patterns.91 Moreover,
[h]aving created a system where whites and Negroes were intentionally
kept apart so that they could not become accustomed to learning to-
gether, the State is responsible for the fact that many whites will react
to the dismantling of that segregated system by attempting to flee to
the suburbs. Indeed, by limiting the District Court to a Detroit-only
remedy ... the Court today allows the State to profit from its own
wrong and to perpetuate for years to come the separation of the races
it achieved in the past by purposeful state action.92
This point does not quite reach the suburbanites as individuals. Mar-
shall made no assumptions about whether suburban voters supported the
State's stream of segregative actions.93 Nonetheless, the majority's invo-
cation of geography94 was more than matched by Marshall's point that
the district lines were entirely under the State's control and generally
unrelated to political subdivisions. 95 These "boundaries" should there-
fore have been highly permeable.
Turning to the question of appropriate redress, the dissent stressed the
modesty of its aims, noting that it was not seeking "some ideal degree" of
integration. 96 The defect in a Detroit-only decree was that it achieved no
actual desegregation, but left all students in racially identifiable schools.
Justice Marshall captured for his own use the majority's axiom that the
nature of the infringement governs the scope of the remedy; this axiom
simply meant that "the function of any remedy is to cure the violation to
which it is addressed." 97 Equity therefore favored an inter-district
approach.98
91. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 805-06.
"[Action taken] to maintain the separation of the races ... does more than
simply influence the short-run composition of the student body .... It may well
promote segregated residential patterns which, when combined with 'neighbor-
hood zoning,' further lock the school system into the mold of separation of the
races. Upon a proper showing a district court may consider this in fashioning a
remedy."
Id. (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971)). See
supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (discussing the Swann decision, rendered at a
time when Justice Marshall was comfortably in accord with the Supreme Court
majority).
92. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 806.
93. See discussion supra Part I.B.l.
94. See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 745; supra note 32 and accompanying text.
95. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 796.
96. See id. at 803.
97. Id. at 806.
98. See id. at 808-09. The district court judge, who had reluctantly flowed into the
vacuum left by the Board of Education's failure to submit a desegregation plan, would
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Any desegregation order necessarily involves some disruption, whether
its ambit is one district or two.99 Yet a metropolitan decree would have
required fewer new busesco and compared favorably (as to the number
of students transported and the time spent riding) with the transporta-
tion plan previously used. 101
As Marshall calibrated the interests at stake on each side, ingrained
racial attitudes and public opposition are less weighty than enforcement
of door-opening constitutional guarantees. Reluctantly, he concluded
that in avoiding a feasible remedy, the majority had chosen popularity
over principle-a choice that would create more problems than it
solved. 102
B. Integration, or Higher Quality Segregated Schools?
The question of whether integration is guaranteed by the Constitution
to Black children, and whether integration (mandated or voluntary) ben-
efits all students or some students, has evoked intense judicial and aca-
demic interest.10 3 The so-called "Briggs dictum," rendered by a panel of
district court judges in South Carolina after Brown II, 1 1 had maintained
have used a panel of experts representing both plaintiffs and defendants to develop such a
plan. See idt at 809-10.
One commentator has concluded that after Milliken 1, lower courts were reluctant to
grant inter-district decrees. See, eg., Note, Out of Focus: The Misapplication of Tradi-
tional Equitable Principles in the Nontraditional Arena of School Desegregation (A Case
Study of Desegregation in Little Rock; Arkansas), 44 Vand. L. Rev. 1315, 1339 (1991).
But see Board of Educ. of Englewood Cliffs v. Board of Educ. of Englewood, Nos. A-
4912-89T5, A-6384-90T5 & A-6385-90T5, slip op. at 70 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June
15, 1992) (holding that state courts are free to accord metropolitan-area redress to rem-
edy violations of the state constitution); James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-
Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1463, 1656, 1659-1660 (1990)
[hereinafter Liebman, Desegregating Politics] (citing examples of such desegregation
orders).
99. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Milliken 1) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). See discussion infra Part II.B. for discussion of how integration measures affect
White students.
100. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 813-14.
101. See id at 812-13. Pairing up Black schools near Detroit's edge with White
schools close by on the other side of the district line was also feasible. See id. at 814.
102. See id. at 814-15.
103. See, eg., Wilkinson, supra note 10; Shades of Brown: New Perspectives on School
Desegregation (Derrick Bell ed., 1980) [hereinafter Shades of Brown]; Liebman, Desegre-
gating Politics, supra note 98; Tushnet, with Lezin, supra note 27; Paul Gewirtz, Choice in
the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 Colum. L Rev. 728
(1986) [hereinafter Gewirtz, Choice]; Drew S. Days, III, Vindicating Civil Rights in
Changing Times, 93 Yale L.J. 990 (1984); James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the
Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection and Litigatively Enforced Legisla-
tive Reform, 76 Va. L. Rev. 349 (1990) [hereinafter Liebman, Implementing Brown]; Paul
Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585 (1983); Leroy D. Clark, The Future
Civil Rights Agenda: Speculation on Litigation, Legislation, and Organization, 38 Cath.
U. L. Rev. 795 (1989); Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race. White Innocence
and Black Abstraction, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (1990); Gary Peller, Race Conscious-
ness, 1990 Duke L.J. 758 (1990).
104. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I1). Brown 11 remanded
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that although a student could not be barred from any public school on
racial grounds, states need not "mix persons of different races in the
schools."' ' Segregation could therefore remain in place, except as to
Negro children who requested transfers to White schools.
It was not until thirteen years later that the Supreme Court disavowed
this dictum. Green v. County School Board 106 rejected an ineffective
"freedom of choice" 10 7 plan, noting that the school board had an affirma-
tive duty of conversion to "a system without a 'white' school and a 'Ne-
gro' school, but just schools."' 0 Nevertheless, the Court subsequently
reiterated in cases ranging from Swann to Spangler that there is no con-
stitutional right to "any particular degree of racial balance."' "°9 Mathe-
matical ratios may be used as a starting point in shaping a remedy, but
not as an inflexible requirement." 0
1. The Equal-But-Separate Model
The tension between a "just schools" rubric and a "no-particular-de-
gree" rubric can be seen in Austin Independent School District v. United
States,"' where three of the Justices concurring on remand of a desegre-
gation order scolded the Fifth Circuit for overreaching in applying the
Green principles. Even if Austin school authorities had intentionally seg-
regated minorities, the desegregation plan went further than was neces-
sary to eliminate the consequences of official misconduct. The
concurrence quoted with approval the argument of the Solicitor General
of the United States that " 'there is nothing inherently inferior about all-
black schools, any more than all-white schools are inferior, when the sep-
aration is not caused by state action.' "112
the companion cases, including the South Carolina litigation Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F.
Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
105. Briggs, 132 F. Supp. at 777.
106. 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
107. See id. at 441.
108. Id. at 442. Green is discussed supra at Part I.A. Commentators have pointed out
that community intimidation in the South effectively prevented "freedom of choice" from
leading to desegregation. See, e.g., Diane Ravitch, Desegregation, Varieties of Meaning,
in Shades of Brown, supra note 103, at 38.
109. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971), quoted with
approval in Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434 (1976).
110. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 25, quoted with approval in Spangler, 427 U.S. at 434;
supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. See also Part I.B.2. for discussion of Swann
and Spangler.
111. 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (remanding desegregation litigation to Fifth Circuit for re-
consideration in light of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). See infra notes 113
& 154.
112. Austin, 429 U.S. at 993 n.2 (quoting the Brief for the United States). Racial segre-
gation imposed by White legislatures and school authorities has never been viewed as
stigmatizing Whites. Thurgood Marshall, as the advocate in Brown, argued that classifi-
cation by race could only be justified by "an inherent determination that the people who
were formerly in slavery... shall be kept as near that stage as is possible; and now is the
time, we submit, that this Court should make clear that this is not what our Constitution
stands for." Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-22, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
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Among the multiple meanings embedded in that statement might be:
all-Black schools are now perceived in the same way as all-White ones;
Black schools are wrongly perceived as inferior, but that perception has
no effect on students; if it were not for misperceptions, Black schools
could educate students equally well; or, Black schools become inferior
only if they are given less resources than White schools.
Justice Marshall did not pick up the gauntlet on the Solicitor General's
modernized equal-but-separate credo; his one-sentence dissent merely
noted that the court below was right." 3 His views on de facto segrega-
tion, however, can be gleaned from his Crawford dissent.' 14 There, he
affirmed that racial isolation is harmful regardless of its genesis because it
deprives minority students of "an equal opportunity for education" and
"an integrated educational experience."' 15
Although Marshall was increasingly alienated from the Supreme
Court majority on integration issues, he joined the rest of his colleagues
"wholeheartedly" when they ordered compensatory measures for Negro
students remaining in mostly-Black schools in the second round of Milli-
ken v. Bradley.1 6 His concurrence noted:
That a northern school board has been found guilty of intentionally
discriminatory acts is, unfortunately, not unusual. That the academic
development of black children has been impaired by this wrongdoing is
to be expected. And, therefore, that a program of remediation is neces-
sary to supplement the primary remedy of pupil reassignment is
inevitable.' 7
483 (1954), in 49A Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United
States 522-23 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Kasper eds., 1975).
113. Austin, 429 U.S. at 990-91. The history of segregation and desegregation in Aus-
tin, Texas is chronicled in United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th
Cir. 1972), and United States v. Texas Education Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir.), va-
cated, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
114. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982). Crawford is discussed supra at
Part I.B.3.
115. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 548-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting with approval
two opinions of the California Supreme Court, Jackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist., 382
P.2d 878, 880-81 (1963), and Crawford v. Board of Educ., 551 P.2d 28, 43 (1976)). But
see supra note 90.
116. 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring) (Milliken I1).
117. Id at 291-292. The majority affirmed the Sixth Circuit's holding that appropriate
state-supported compensatory measures must include reading and counseling compo-
nents, without which Black students could be hampered in their motivation and achieve-
ment levels. See iL at 278, 287, 289-90. The majority also recognized the consequences
of racial separation (but without acknowledging that these consequences would occur
even in situations of de facto segregation):
Children who have been thus educationally and culturally set apart from the
larger community will inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct, and atti-
tudes reflecting their cultural isolation. They are likely to acquire speech habits,
for example, which vary from the environment in which they must ultimately
function and compete, if they are to enter and be a part of that community.
This is not peculiar to race; in this setting, it can affect any children who, as a
group, are isolated by force of law from the mainstream.
Id at 287.
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The irony of the two Millikens, rejecting an effective desegregation
plan but embracing a state-financed infusion of additional resources for
inner-city schools, has not escaped comment. As Paul R. Dimond puts
it, "[p]erhaps, in its own way, it is a 'separate but equal' result for our
times."118
Some African-American scholars, such as Professor Derrick Bell, have
suggested that "[d]esegregation remedies that do not integrate"1 19 may
produce substantial educational benefits. A mostly-Black school that is
run by experienced minority educators, staffed by teachers with high ex-
pectations of student achievement, buttressed by parental involvement,
and supported by a budget that at least matches the "best" White schools
in the district, 120 could provide self-assurance and academic enrichment
to Black students. 121 Such students would not be exposed to the "racial
harassment ranging from exclusion from extra-curricular activities to
physical violence" that has occurred at some integrated facilities.122
Judge Robert L. Carter, 23 a leading attorney in the Brown litigation,
states:
While we fashioned Brown on the theory that equal education and inte-
grated education were one and the same, the goal was not integration
but equal educational opportunity .... If I had to prepare for Brown
today, instead of looking principally to the social scientists to demon-
strate the adverse consequences of segregation, I would seek to recruit
educators to formulate a concrete definition of... equality in educa-
tion, and I would ... seek to persuade the Court that equal education
in its constitutional dimensions must, at the very least, conform to the
contours ... defined by the educators. 124
118. Paul R. Dimond, Remarks at Brown v. Board of Education and Its Legacy: A
Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall 88 (Mar. 24, 1992) (transcript on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (article based on speech included in this issue of the Fordham Law
Review).
119. Derrick Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in Shades of Brown,
supra note 103, at 101.
120. See id. at 130.
121. See id. at 138. Black Issues in Higher Education, a bi-weekly publication, recently
reported that most Black Ph.D.'s still come from Black colleges. See Karen De Witt,
Rise in Number of Black Ph.D's Is Reported, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1992, at A21; see also
Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and theAfrocentric Curriculum, 101 Yale L.J. 1285, 1287 (1992).
Jarvis discusses the view that Black children, whose ancestors and experiences are
"marginalized" in many schools, should be offered an Afrocentric perspective. Black
parents, however, might object that "such a program in a resegregated setting only fur-
ther stigmatizes graduates" unless it also prepares students for standardized tests and a
competitive place in society. Id. at 1300.
122. Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in Shades of Brown, supra
note 103, at 100.
123. Judge Carter, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, was formerly General Counsel of the NAACP.
124. Robert L. Carter, A Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in Shades of Brown, supra
note 103, at 27. Judge Carter notes the "reality" that hundreds of thousands of urban
poor Black children presently attend mostly-Black schools that do not give them the
skills needed to join the economic and social mainstream. See id. at 26.
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2. The Integration-Plus Model
Justice Marshall called busing "one of the basic emotional and legal
issues underlying [segregation] cases."' 25 His decisions invariably in-
cluded a feasibility analysis of the remedy under consideration.' 26
Before Brown I, busing had been (unemotionally) regarded as a conve-
nient way of getting to school. Indeed, the Supreme Court had unani-
mously held in its Swann 27 phase that quite apart from the
desegregation context, bus transportation was a "normal and accepted"
part of educational policy involving millions of public school children
each year.1
28
In Marshall's view, however, transportation for integration provoked a
different response because of the message of Black inferiority that Whites
and Blacks have both heard. That message produced the "unique harm
associated with a system of racially identifiable schools."' 29 His Craw-
ford dissent observed that White resistance to desegregation emanated
from racial as well as anti-busing concerns:
[T]he allegedly compelling interest in establishing "neighborhood
schools" so often referred to by the majority appears nowhere in
[Proposition 's] official list of justifications .... [This] is not surpris-
ing in light of the fact that the Proposition's ban on student "assign-
ment" [covers] desegregation remedies that would not require a
student to leave his "neighborhood."'130
Always the pragmatist, Marshall concluded that segregation not only
has a psychological impact, impairing the motivation of African-Ameri-
can children, but also has an economic consequence. School boards, he
wrote in 1991, continue to allocate inferior facilities, teachers, and
125. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 812 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Milliken
I).
126. See, eg., Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 813 (comparing a 40-minute ceiling each way
with present busing of one and a quarter hours or more each way; overall, the plan con-
templated by the district court compared favorably with the transportation regimen al-
ready in use); see also Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 647 & n.11 (1991)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the "proven feasibility" of the district court's de-
segregation plan, and noting that the board had a variety of devices at its disposal to
minimize busing but failed to use them).
127. Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (discussed supra
at notes 21-24 and accompanying text).
128. See id. at 29. Chief Justice Burger's Swann opinion added: "All things being
equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to
schools nearest their homes. But all things are not equal in a system that has been delib-
erately constructed and maintained to enforce racial segregation." Id. at 28. See also
Implementing Brown, supra note 103, at 364 n.68, collecting authorities showing that
busing is safer than walking to school. The amount and distance of busing have not had a
significant effect on the degree of "white flight" caused by different desegregation plans.
See Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra note 98, at 1623 n.672.
129. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 642.
130. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 559 n.6 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). See supra Part I.B.3. for discussion of Proposition I.
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courses to many Black schools."' Professor Paul Gewirtz suggests that
"green follows white"-a school where White students are in the major-
ity is protected against discriminatory distribution of money and
resources. 
132
Quite apart from his doubts about the viability of an updated equal-
but-separate model, Justice Marshall valued integration because it con-
fers positive benefits on all children. He identified "learning together" as
a crucial factor in the ability to live together as adults, with mutual re-
spect for similarities as well as differences. 133
For Black children, desegregation provides personal contact with "the
environment in which they must ultimately function and compete, if they
are to enter and be a part of [the larger] community."' 34 Professor Leroy
Clark notes that although there have been instances where Black stu-
dents in newly-integrated facilities have been ostracized or have segre-
gated themselves, such students must deal with their own feelings of
distrust because they will be interacting with Whites in their future em-
ployment. 135 Studies indicate that adults who have attended integrated
elementary and secondary schools are "significantly more comfortable in
integrated work and social settings" than graduates of segregated
institutions. 136
Academic achievement of Blacks in desegregated schools tends to ac-
celerate, with gains in test scores ranging from "moderate" to "signifi-
cant."' 137 Scholars have noted that teachers in integrated classes are less
131. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 643 n.5, 648 n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Dowell is dis-
cussed supra at Part I.B.4., and infra at Part II.C.
132. See Gewirtz, Choice, supra note 103, at 776. On the question of whether Black-
run school boards or decentralized control of schools could counter the problem of un-
equally distributed resources, some authorities have expressed skepticism. State govern-
ments generally control the political and economic resources that would be needed to
upgrade local schools, and long-term experiments with decentralized schools have been
disappointing. See Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra note 98, at 1489-90 n.142.
Professor Liebman comments:
The absence of this equality-assuring condition in my view dooms [the] gilded-
ghetto remedies, for in the long run white taxpayers are less likely to gild some-
one else's schools-particularly those of a race against whom they have discrim-
inated persistently in the past-than they are to gild their own children's (and,
if integrated, everyone else's) schools.
Id. at 1617 n.650.
133. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 806 (1974) (Milliken 1) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting); id. at 783. One function of education is to provide children with the informa-
tion and skills necessary to evaluate new life-plan options. See Amy Gutmann,
Democratic Education 30-31 (1987).
134. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 287 (1977) (Milliken I1). Milliken II is an
opinion with which Justice Marshall enthusiastically concurred. See id. at 291.
135. Clark, supra note 103, at 802-03. In an integrated school, "minority students
potentially learn the extra-academic social and cultural modes of the majority community(and vice versa) and develop personal alliances that give access to information, jobs, or
other opportunities." Id. at 802.
136. Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra note 98, at 1626-27. This finding was ap-
plicable to Whites as well as Blacks.
137. See id. at 1624-25 n.675 (collecting authorities). Researchers generally agree that
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likely than their counterparts in all-Black settings to convey low expecta-
tions of achievement to the students.1 38
Integration would not adversely affect Whites, Marshall had suggested
in his Brown argument, because schools could "[p]ut the dumb colored
children in with the dumb white children, and put the smart colored
children in with the smart white children." 139 Commentators have con-
cluded from the available data that integration neither hurts nor helps
the academic accomplishments of ,Vhites,14° and that Whites who actu-
ally had a family member attending a desegregated school generally
viewed the resulting experience favorably. 1 4
Yet, dissatisfaction can infect the "lasting integration"' 4 2 that Mar-
shall invoked if the energy poured into the initial phases of a desegrega-
tion plan is not rechannelled into delivering educational quality. A tale
of two systems illustrates this point. Parents and officials in the Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg district that was the focus of Swann have recently
called for new initiatives such as magnet schools with specialized offer-
ings. "Busing wasn't addressing the educational excellence we
needed," 43 noted a newly-elected board member.
Hillsborough County, near Tampa, Florida, provides a contrasting ex-
ample of a school district that captured the talent and money required to
the kind of expectations that are conveyed to students are a key factor in the success of
schooling. See id Desegregation may also have a substantial impact on Black IQ scores.
See iL The likelihood of dropping out of school, becoming pregnant, or engaging in acts
of delinquency is also lower than among Black children in segregated schools. See id. at
1625-26.
138. See id. at 1624-25 n.675.
139. Argument: The Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, 1952-55, at 402 (Leon Friedman ed., 1983). Critics have pointed
out that Black children attending predominantly White schools often are inappropriately
"tracked" into lower level classes or towards less competitive post-secondary schools.
See Jarvis, supra note 121, at 1292.
Although "white ffight" from desegregation occurs, particularly in northern cities
where school districts do not cover the whole metropolitan area as in Miliken I, some
studies suggest that after three years this phenomenon slows and sometimes reverses itself
as parents choose a high-quality integrated school. See Liebman, Desegregating Politics,
supra note 98, at 1622-23, 1633-34.
140. See, e.g., Willis D. Hawley et al., Strategies for Effective Desegregation 10 (1983);
Susan E. Mayer & Christopher Jencks, Growing Up in Poor Neighborhoods." How Much
Does It Matter?, 243 Science 1441, 1443 (1989).
141. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Hochschild, The New American Dilemma: Liberal Democ-
racy and Social Desegregation 179-87 (1984) (also noting that the number of White sup-
porters of integrated schools has increased most dramatically among the ranks of
southerners whose children were affected by court desegregation decrees).
142. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. CL 630, 643 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(also discussing the remedial measures needed to prevent "the stamp of inferiority placed
upon Afr[ican]-American children from becoming a self-perpetuating phenomenon").
143. Peter Applebome, Busing is Abandoned Even in Charlotte, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15,
1992, at BIl. Community representatives and students nevertheless reaffirmed their
commitment to integration. A former school superintendent remarked, "I remember
when [President] Ronald Reagan made a speech here and described busing as a social
experiment that has not worked, and he was met with dead silence. What happened in
Charlotte became a matter of community pride." Id.
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produce superior education as segregation was being dismantled. Profes-
sor Drew Days1" described key elements in this creative effort: a large
committee composed of representatives of the business and civic commu-
nity, civil rights organizations, and (yes) White supremacist groups that
helped plan and implement the desegregation mandated by a committed
district court judge; educational enrichment programs assisted by federal
grants; and pairing and clustering of schools in the city and suburbs. 145
The schools have been desegregated for almost twenty-one years; the
"students know that at the end of the bus ride . . . [is] quality
education."' 14 6
C. 'Attenuated" Causation and the Graceful Exit
In the 1990s, causation analysis has been the Supreme Court's avenue
of exit from the field of desegregation. A district with racially identifi-
able schools can be termed desegregated, the Dowell majority indicated,
once "the effects of past intentional discrimination" have been reme-
died. 147 Federal judges should relinquish control rather than attempting
to eliminate a condition that was not caused by a constitutional
violation. 1
48
Probably so, but what standard do we apply in deciding whether the
old pollution has disappeared, making it unnecessary to wade through
any complexities to analyze a new one? The majority was silent on the
burdens of proof that might guide a district judge in assessing competing
claims. Nor did the Court decide whether a school board has an affirma-
tive duty to use every practical and available clean-up device.
Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion identified two critical fac-
tors-time and demography-that could renovate the history of a dis-
trict's discrimination. Before the litigation that resulted in a
desegregation order (the "Finger Plan"), the State had imposed residen-
144. Professor Days, Alfred M. Rankin Professor at Yale Law School, had multiple
connections with the Hillsborough situation. He was formerly on the legal staff of the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and represented the plaintiffs in Man-
nings v. Board of Public Instruction, 306 F. Supp. 497 (M.D. Fla. 1969), which resulted
in the desegregation decree. He had also lived in the Hillsborough area from the years
1947 to 1953 and attended its segregated schools.
145. See Drew S. Days, III, Remarks at Brown v. Board of Education and Its Legacy:
A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall 66-68 (Mar. 24, 1992) (transcript on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (article based on speech included in this issue of the Fordham Law
Review).
146. Days, supra note 145, at 70. For other examples of successful desegregation
plans, see Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra note 98, at 1467.
147. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 637 (1991) (citing with approval the
concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, then Judge Kennedy of the Ninth Circuit, in
Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979)). See
supra Part I.B.4. for a discussion of Dowell.
148. A constitutional right to integration, a commentator has suggested, "would re-
quire permanent court supervision of school districts and judicial restructuring of local
government entities." The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Leading Cases, 105 Harv. L.
Rev. 177, 273 (1991).
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tial segregation and Oklahoma City had intentionally segregated both
housing and schools.149 After more than ten years of implementing the
Finger Plan, the school board adopted a reassignment policy based on
neighborhood patterns. Under this policy, a majority of the city's ele-
mentary schools became more than ninety percent Black or ninety per-
cent non-Black. 150
Looking backwards can be overdone, the Court indicated. The litiga-
tion commenced almost thirty years ago. The board had now complied
for a reasonable period with constitutional demands, and continuation of
the desegregation decree "in perpetuity" would displace local
authority.
1 5 1
Population movements could account for any stubborn problem. Resi-
dential segregation presently existing in Oklahoma City resulted from
"private decisionmaking and economics, and ... was too attenuated to
be a vestige of former school segregation," '152 the district court had
found. Uncertain as to whether the Tenth Circuit had rejected this find-
ing as clearly erroneous, Chief Justice Rehnquist's remand instructed
both courts below to reconsider the issue.1
53
If private choice had dictated current housing patterns, with previous
state-imposed residential segregation playing too attenuated a role to
count, would the board be free to base a student assignment policy on
these neighborhood patterns? The majority apparently assumed without
discussion that such a policy could be justified even if the segregative
results were foreseeable.1 54
149. See Dowell, 1 I1 S. Ct. at 633 (setting out the district court's findings).
150. See id. at 634.
151. See iL at 637.
152. Id. at 638 n.2.
153. See id. at 638. In prior phases of the case, the district court had been reversed
twice by the Tenth Circuit. After the district court denied the plaintiff's motion to re-
open the case, the circuit court held that an earlier finding that the school district was
unitary did not affect the vitality or duration of the permanent injunction. See Dowell v.
Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
The second reversal came in response to the district court's dissolution of the desegre-
gation decree. The Tenth Circuit stated that the focus is "not on whether the [new] Plan
is nondiscriminatory but whether it solves the problems created by the changed condi-
tions in the District." Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1504 (10th Cir. 1989),
rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). The circuit court found that the new plan would restore the
effects of past discrimination, see id. at 1504, and remanded with orders to use the Finger
Plan, which could be modified as necessary. See id. at 1505-06.
154. It is curious that although Dowell referred briefly to the present board's "good
faith," see Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 634 (1991), the Court made no
mention of Austin Independent School District v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
Citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), Austin vacated the decision in United
States v. Texas Education Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976). There, the Fifth Circuit
had reasoned: "[S]chool authorities may not constitutionally use a neighborhood assign-
ment policy ... in a district with... segregated residential patterns. A segregated school
system is the foreseeable and inevitable result of such an assignment policy (and, there-
fore] we may infer that the school authorities have acted with segregative intent." Texas
Education, 532 F.2d at 392. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in the Supreme Court
angrily retorted that in areas where boundary-line changes, contiguous pairing of schools,
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The remand's causation inquiry-was residential segregation the "re-
sult of" or "too attenuated"I '-did not come with any further instruc-
tions as to how to measure or weigh the impact of prior state activity.
Justice Marshall's dissent attempted to refine this inquiry, suggesting
that the district court should decide whether the school board's past con-
duct had been a "contributing cause" to the housing patterns, 56 -that is,
would the relevant neighborhoods have been more integrated but for the
board's unlawful acts.
Any measurement of causation is problematic here until we engage in
a further dissection of what has been caused. Marshall would respond in
one word: attitudes. If the State labels Black children as undesirable
schoolmates, it is also labeling them as undesirable neighbors.
The dissent could not accept the notion of "private decisionmaking" 57
in a vacuum. In Keyes v. School District No. 1,158 the Supreme Court had
noted that school segregation could have "a profound reciprocal effect on
the racial composition of residential neighborhoods."' 59 Oklahoma City
policy illustrated this reciprocity. The board had in the past used a neigh-
borhood school policy to track and extend all-Negro housing, destroying
integrated neighborhoods and, in the process, increasing the number of
segregated schools."6
Because the board "creat[ed] 'all-Negro' schools clouded by the stigma
of segregation-schools to which white parents would not opt to send
their children,"'16' housing patterns were altered. A school district that
or magnet schools will not produce desegregation, school boards are not obliged to
achieve racial balance by extensive cross-busing. See Austin, 429 U.S. at 994-95 (Powell,
J., concurring). Austin is discussed further supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
155. See Dowell, 11l S. Ct. at 638 n.2.
156. See id. at 646 n.8 (the dissent quoted with approval Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 n.13 (1979)).
157. See id. at 638 n.2.
158. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
159. Id. at 202.
160. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 646 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing the findings of the district court). Because the school board had contributed to
residential segregation, the district court did not allow the board to use a neighborhood
plan in the racially-isolated northeast quadrant. See id.
161. Id. A recent New York Times account notes that while housing segregation re-
sults in part from "enclaves... developed around religious institutions and shared cul-
tures ... like in Little Italy and Jewish sections of the Lower East Side," some racially
segregated residential patterns in New York State are the result of suburban zoning regu-
lations and "steering" by the City Housing Authority. Sam Roberts, Shifts in 80's Failed
to Ease Segregation, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1992, at Bl, B4.
Professor Ted Shaw concludes:
We are very ahistorical, for segregation in this country . . . is the result of
decades and decades of state and private action, federal action, actions taken on
the local level, all [of] which interact ... to produce the segregative patterns
that exist now, which we take for granted and which we assume to be the result
of choice, or merit, or some other ... factor that ignores the history of racism
and segregation.
Theodore M. Shaw, Remarks at Brown v. Board of Education and Its Legacy: A Tribute
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contributed to creating such parental "preferences" should not be per-
mitted to build on them to construct a student assignment policy.
Nonetheless, the board's decade of prior good behavior posed a chal-
lenge to Marshall's approach. Such a challenge might have been even
more formidable if the question of dissolving the desegregation decree
had arisen before the offending new resegregative policy.'62
Drawing carefully from the Court's prior (though now less-favored)
jurisprudence, the dissent reminded the majority of the role of presump-
tions. Racially identifiable schools, emerging in a district where past de
jure segregation has been proven, are presumptively the result of inten-
tional discrimination. The burden then shifts to the school board to
show that there is no causal link and to "justify use of... resegregative
methods."163
The claim that the current board was pursuing legitimate policies in
good faith"' did not conclusively rebut the causal presumption. The
board could prove its commitment to "the ideal of an integrated sys-
tem"16 by choosing the feasible and effective desegregation measures at
to Justice Thurgood Marshall 97 (Mar. 24, 1992) (transcript on file with the Fordham
Law Review) (article based on speech included in this issue of the Fordham Law Review).
162. The dissent treated this before-the-resegregation point as irrelevant, because "the
Board's readoption of neighborhood attendance zones cannot be ignored arbitrarily."
Dowell, 111 S. CL at 645 n.7. The majority, however, instructed the district court to
decide "whether the Board made a sufficient showing of constitutional compliance as of
1985, when the [new policy] was adopted, to allow the injunction to be dissolved." Id. at
638.
163. Id. at 647 n.10 (citing Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkrnan, 443 U.S. 526, 537-38
(1979); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 467 (1972); Swam v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 437-38 (1968)).
164. The majority's statement of facts gives demographics and inner-city isolation as
the reason for the board's adoption of a reassignment policy. See id. at 634; supra notes
128 & 139 (discussing studies of "white flight").
Neither the dissent nor the majority devoted much discussion to the fact that the stu-
dents involved in the board's neighborhood plan were those in kindergarten through
fourth grade, not older children. Chief Justice Rehnquist referred briefly to the busing
burden on "young black students," see Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 634
(1991), while Justice Marshall concluded that the prior successful use of the Finger Plan
(busing first through fourth grades) proved its feasibility. See id. at 647-48 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
165. Dowell, 111 U.S. at 644 n.6. A criterion of commitment to integration could also
take into account the larger community that brings influence to bear on a school board.
Professor Liebman has suggested consideration of negative indicia, such as "the conform-
ity of segregative political decisions to the expressly racial preferences of members of the
constituency," Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra note 98, at 1593 n.550, and positive
indicia, including the growth of residential integration and "a history of substantial mi-
nority representation among the leadership and staff of the various previously discrimina-
tory agencies." Id. at 1653.
In his persuasive and comprehensive article, Professor Liebman analyzes prevalent the-
ories of desegregation and develops a reformative approach that locates the violation
found in the Supreme Court's desegregation decisions in the political rather than the
educational process. See id. at 1475. This reconstruction "recognizes that citizen-partici-
pants [in American society] must pay the republican price of civic virtue (modernized,
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its disposal.
Turning the thirty-years-of-supervision lament back on the majority,
the dissent noted that the board had not only restricted the successful
"Finger Plan," but had also failed to use school site location and magnet
schools to promote integration and decrease busing. This default was a
poor predicate for a sympathy plea: "A school district's failures . . .
should not lead federal courts... to renounce supervision of unfinished
tasks because of the lateness of the hour."' 166
Some observers have concluded that judges can shorten the supervi-
sion period by insisting on results instead of the familiar "deliberate
speed." Professor Drew Days states that the successful desegregation of
the Hillsborough County, Florida schools 167 occurred in part because the
federal district court judge assigned to it
was truly committed to making Brown a reality in that school district
.... [H]e constantly applied to the school board to achieve further
desegregation ... [and] made clear that he meant business. In other
cases I handled during that period, the desegregation process lan-
guished because the district judges lacked the conviction or the guts to
get the job done. 168
The dissent's reluctance to lift the Dowell decree reflected its disagree-
ment with the majority's ranking of the competing values involved: the
decree's vintage versus its failure; the board's autonomy versus the
cramped educational opportunities for Black children left in racially
identifiable schools. Such a ranking must be governed by the Constitu-
tion rather than convenience or personal outlook. Justice Marshall was
willing to tinker with the mechanics of the (already passive) supervision
process, entertaining the possibility of modifying the injunction. 69
He was unwilling, however, to accommodate a change in the standards
that would govern future cases. The Court's inclination towards ac-
pluralized, and economized into a duty of 'equal concern and respect') in return for the
benefits of participation." Id. at 1632.
166. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 647 n. 11. Justice Marshall also quoted the district court's
explanation of why the Finger Plan had been imposed in 1972: "'This litigation has been
frustratingly interminable, not because of insuperable difficulties of implementation of the
commands of the Supreme Court ... and the Constitution ... but because of the un-
pardonable recalcitrance of the ... Board.'" Id. at 640 (quoting the district court opin-
ion, 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1271 (W.D. Okla. 1972)).
167. See further discussion of the Hillsborough County litigation supra notes 144-46
and accompanying text.
168. Days, supra note 145, at 66. Cf Nathaniel R. Jones, Remarks at Brown v. Board
of Education and Its Legacy: A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall 80-82 (Mar. 24,
1992) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review) (article based on speech included
in this issue of the Fordham Law Review) (providing an example of a district judge with
the conviction to desegregate schools).
A number of studies have supported Justice Marshall's assumption that court decrees
significantly increase the likelihood that racially identifiable schools will become "just
schools," in the Green parlance. See Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra note 98, at
1467-68.
169. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 648.
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cepting "attenuated" causation and its failure to apply the presumptions
established in prior decisions could signal a departure from the desegre-
gation field. This departure would be tantamount to a declaration that
the impact of State-sponsored segregation has been countered. Justice
Marshall would reserve such declarations of victory for cases in which
there are no "unfinished tasks."
III. JUSTICE MARSHALL REJECTED AND REMEMBERED
After Justice Marshall's 1991 retirement, the high Court continued to
examine the question of when to entrust the operation of schools to local
authorities. In Freeman v. Pitts,' the Justices issued a cluster of views
(but no dissents) easing federal control of elementary and secondary
schools. 171 By contrast, United States v. Fordice '72 concerned universi-
ties, and produced an unexpected eight-to-one disapproval of Missis-
sippi's freedom-of-choice plan.
A. The Incremental Withdrawal
The point on which all the Justices in Freeman agreed in principle was
that a district court has discretion to relinquish supervision over some
aspects of a formerly segregated school system, even if violations are con-
tinuing in other aspects.173 Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court held
that the ultimate goal of returning schools to local authorities should be
accomplished by pouring all the supervisory resources of the district
courts into the desegregation decree at the outset of the litigation, and
then providing for an orderly withdrawal from control when sufficient
170. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
171. See generally id (rejecting the court of appeals mandate of judicial supervision
over local school board's compliance with desegregation plans).
172. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
173. See Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1443. Dekalb County School System ("DCSS") exper-
ienced enormous growth in its minority population, expanding from 5.6% in 1969 to
47% in 1986. See id. at 1438. As more Black families moved into DeKalb County, a
distinct segregative pattern reflecting housing enclaves emerged. Fifty percent of the
Black students attended schools that were more than 90% Black. See id. The district
court, nonetheless, found DCSS to be in compliance with constitutional requirements
with respect to four of the six factors discussed in Green-student assignments, extracur-
ricular activities, transportation, and physical facilities. See id. at 1441-42. The district
court terminated active supervision in those areas and decided to supervise only the im-
plementation of the remaining Green factors-faculty and staff assignments, and quality
of education. See id at 1442.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that DCSS had an affirmative duty to correct
racial imbalance in student assignments. See id. The Supreme Court, reversing the court
of appeals ruling, found that the district court had correctly decided to relinquish control
gradually:
It was an appropriate exercise of its discretion for the District Court to address
the elements of a unitary system discussed in Green .... By withdrawing con-
trol over areas where judicial supervision is no longer needed, a district court
can concentrate both its own resources and those of the school district on the
areas where the effects of dejure discrimination have not been eliminated ....
Id at 1446-47.
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compliance has been demonstrated." The "bizarre" measures permit-
ted by Swann ' to achieve racial balance are not appropriate in the late
phases of carrying out a decree when demographics rather than discrimi-
nation have created the racial isolation. 76
Modem society is mobile, the Court concluded, and "[r]esidential
housing choices and their attendant effects on the racial composition of
schools, present an ever-changing pattern, one difficult to address
through judicial remedies."' 177 Moving towards the updated equal-but-
separate model, Justice Kennedy suggested that the DeKalb County
School System ("DCSS") could direct scarce resources to improving the
quality of education, rather than concentrating on the racial composition
of the student body.17
A concurrence "in the judgment" by Justice Blackmun, joined by Ste-
vens and O'Connor, expressed serious reservations about the Court's
causation analysis and its withdrawal plan.'7 9 DCSS had used attend-
ance zones and new school construction to create schools that were over
fifty percent Black even when the district-wide Black student population
was less than six percent. 8 0 At this stage in the litigation, it would be
naive for the district court to "disarm" itself by restricting its jurisdiction
in reliance on the board's promises. 81 In the same vein, Justice Souter
174. See id. at 1445.
175. See id. at 1447 (referring to Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 28 (1971)).
176. See id.
177. Id. at 1448. The Court viewed these demographic shifts as the inevitable result of
suburbanization. See id. at 1440. The causes were specifically stated as an increase in
work opportunities, a decline in the birth rate in White families, the completion of a new
interstate highway, and "blockbusting of formerly white neighborhoods leading to selling
and buying of real estate ... on a highly dynamic basis." Id. The district court had
found that the school system's prior unconstitutional actions did not contribute to the
residential segregation, which would have occurred regardless of any off-setting measures
the board might have used. See id.
178. See id. at 1448.
179. See id. at 1457-60.
180. See id. at 1458-59. DCSS tracked residential patterns in Black areas, built new
schools that were virtually all-White, and used administrative devices to undermine the
"majority to minority" program that should have facilitated the transfer of Negro stu-
dents to White schools. The concurrence stated that because "many families are con-
cerned about the racial composition of a prospective school and will make residential
decisions accordingly," id. at 1457, the courts below should have considered whether
factors such as a racially identifiable faculty and student body could have contributed to
subsequent demographic changes. See id. at 1458. The district court had concluded in
1976 that the system's policies contributed to the increasing racial imbalance in its stu-
dent population. See id. at 1459. Justice Blackmun's concurrence suggested that, at a
minimum, DCSS should have been required to demonstrate that "but for the demo-
graphic changes between 1976 and 1985," id., its actions would have been sufficient to
convert racially identifiable schools into "just schools." See id. at 1459-60 (referring to
the credo of Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968)). The court of appeals,
which had not reached the causation issue, should review the district court's findings.
See id. at 1460.
181. See id. at 1456. The two areas of the school system that indisputably remained
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observed that federal judges should proceed cautiously in releasing
school districts from supervision, because vestiges of discrimination re-
maining in some aspects of the school system may "act as an incubator
for resegregation in others."'
' 8 2
In Justice Scalia's view, the Court's narrowly based incremental with-
drawal strategy was too timid rather than too reckless. 8 3 Instead of sift-
ing through "'a melange of past happenings' 1814 to see if there are
vestiges of prior discrimination, the Justices should have concentrated on
restructuring the way that burdens of proof are allocated in desegrega-
tion cases.1
s5
The placement of burdens of proof determines the result in most cau-
sality inquiries. If school boards must prove a negative-that imbalance
does not stem from their past illegalities-they will generally lose. Con-
versely, plaintiffs will "almost always lose" if they have the burden of
showing that present racial separation is in part attributable to former de
jure violations.186
The choice of compelling defendants to negate causality was made
twenty-five years ago in Green, as a way of justifying "an affirmative duty
to desegregate." ' School authorities were expected to eliminate what
was presumably (and virtually irrebuttably) the residue of their miscon-
duct. In 1992, the rational basis for this presumption of causality "must
dissipate as the de jure system and the school boards who produced it
recede further into the past." ' Invoking "ordinary principles of our
law, of our democratic heritage,"' 8 9 Justice Scalia urged that soon the
burden of proof on causation be switched to plaintiffs.'19 Public educa-
tion in the North and South should be under the control of parents and
locally elected officials."'
Assume that Justice Marshall was still on the bench during the Free-
man deliberations, and that he was moved to issue a dissent rather than
to join the Blackmun or Souter concurrences. What follows, offered on
out of compliance-expenditures and teacher assignments-are the "factors over which
DCSS exercises the greatest control." Id
182. Id. at 1455.
183. Justice Scalia's concurrence concluded that the Court's decision would have little
impact "upon the many other school districts... that are still being supervised by federal
judges, since it turns upon the extraordinarily rare circumstance of a finding that no
portion of the current racial imbalance is a remnant of prior dejure discrimination." Id.
at 1450.
184. Id at 1451 (quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 512 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
185. See id. at 1452.
186. See id
187. Id at 1453 (citation omitted).
188. Id
189. Id at 1454.
190. See id.
191. See id.
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the basis of Marshall's prior expressions and insights, is a draft opinion
that he might have written.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, DISSENTING
Today, the Court announces that in order to restore the
"true accountability," ante, at 1445, of local authorities, it
will approve incremental withdrawal of judicial supervision
over a formerly dejure segregated system before full compli-
ance with the Fourteenth Amendment has been achieved. In
so doing, it reverses a court of appeals decision that requires
only that a school board demonstrate its "accountability" to
the judiciary and the Constitution by maintaininF racial
equality in all its operations for at least three years.
Despite the modesty of this requirement, the DeKalb
County School System could not meet it. Throughout their
history, DCSS schools have remained both separate and une-
qual. By 1975, as my brother Blackmun notes, almost three-
quarters of black elementary students and the majority of
black high school students were attending mostly-black
schools, even though the percentages of African-American
students in the district as a whole were only 20% and 13%,
in these two respective age groups. Ante, at 1459.
School officials now plead that demography is destiny, and
that they were unable to contain the further rise of segrega-
tion because of post-1975 population changes. Under our
prior holdings, these changes should be viewed in light of the
"profound reciprocal effect" that school segregation has on
residential patterns.2 Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413
U.S. 189, 202 (1973). The majority manages on the one hand
to admit a "correlation" between the two, and on the other to
pronounce that correlation to be no more than evidence of
"private choices." Ante, at 1448. The board's responsibility
in creating all-black schools through site location and student
assignments is virtually read out of the picture.
Indeed, the Court suggests that in fixing such legal respon-
sibilities, we must not "overstate" the consequences of past
1. See Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438, 1450 (lth Cir. 1989).
Other circuit courts have adopted this approach. See Morgan v.
Burke, 926 F.2d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1664
(1992); Quarles v. Oxford Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 868 F.2d 750, 752
(5th Cir. 1989); Ross v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 227
(5th Cir. 1983); Youngblood v. Board of Educ., 448 F.2d 770, 771
(5th Cir. 1971).
2. When white parents make residential choices, they do not
gravitate towards districts where their children would be assigned to
black schools stigmatized by segregation. Cf Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971) (the "building
[of] new schools in the areas of white suburban expansion farthest
from Negro population centers" may promote segregation in residen-
tial patterns as well as schools).
1992] JUSTICE MARSHALL & DESEGREGATION
discrimination. IL I believe that understatement is the real
danger. Again,
a majority of this Court signals that it regards racial
discrimination as largely a phenomenon of the past,
and that government bodies need no longer preoc-
cupy themselves with rectifying racial injustice....
In constitutionalizing its wishful thinking, the ma-
jority today does a grave disservice not only to
those victims of past and present racial discrimina-
tion whom government has sought to assist, but
also to this Court's long tradition of approaching
issues of race with the utmost sensitivity.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552-53
(1989) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
The Court's optimism about the effect of time in causing
vestiges of segregation to diminish is matched by its pessi-
mism about the "practical ability of the federal courts to try
to counteract" great demographic changes. Ante, at 1446,
1448. Yet respondents' brief in this Court suggests a number
of available techniques in the area of student assignments. 3
I recognize that the majority's remand permits further de-
velopment of these issues. Unfortunately, however, the em-
phasis in the Court's guiding opinion on the "ultimate
objective" of returning school districts to local control, ante,
at 1445, when coupled with its unrealistically narrow view of
causality, may lead the courts below to favor premature and
piecemeal federal withdrawal.
On the key question of the board's intent, the majority in-
dicates that new proceedings are appropriate to determine
whether school officials have merely refrained from acting in
bad faith, or whether they have met the standard4 of showing
"an affirmative commitment to comply in good faith with the
entirety of a desegregation plan." Ante, at 1450. Application
of this standard to DeKalb County demonstrates, on the am-
ple record already before us, that time has not been a purifier.
3. Respondents' Brief at 40 n.21. DCSS could implement a
large-scale magnet program (rather than the few existing magnet
classrooms that involve only 1% of the student population), grade re-
organization, and a busing plan which would have a desegregative ef-
feet. Id Although the district court stated that" 'massive bussing...
is not considered a viable option by either [of] the parties or this
court,"' App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a, respondents argued that the
court's failure to consider bus transportation was erroneous. Respon-
dents' Brief at 40 n.21. This error, and others, led the court "to the
perplexing conclusion that maximum practical desegregation had
been achieved though more desegregation could be accomplished."
Id
4. Because we have established an affirmative duty to desegre-
gate, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28
(1971); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968), re-
spondents need not show discriminatory intent to establish the uncon-
stitutionality of policies traceable to prior de jure segregation.
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DCSS still discriminates. In some areas, its black students
have trailers as classrooms, while none of its white students
are similarly treated. Faculty assigned to its African-Ameri-
can students are less experienced and less well-educated.
DCSS offers no adequate compensation for these disadvan-
tages. Quite the contrary, the per capita expenditure for
black schools is lower than for white schools. Ante, at 1442.
Desegregation is often a complex task, and it becomes
more so when a school board delays or discounts its affirma-
tive obligation to dismantle a dual system. By exalting con-
venience and public complaint over constitutional
guarantees, this Court adopts rationalizations that bear an
uncomfortable resemblance to those in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896):
"The great principle . . . is, that . . . all persons
without distinction of age... or color. . . are equal
before the law. . . . But, when this . . . principle
comes to be applied to the actual ... conditions of
persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion
... that children and adults are legally to... be
subject to the same treatment; but only that the
rights of all... are equally entitled to... paternal
consideration .... "
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544 (quoting Roberts v. City of Boston, 5
Cush. 198, 206 (1849)).
Black children do not ask to be treated as though they
were adults, just to be treated like any other children.
I dissent.
*g * * *
B. Causality in the Colleges
Professor Mark Tushnet reveals that during the deliberations on the
pre-Brown decisions about university segregation, 192 the Justices of the
Supreme Court "believed that the federal courts could pull off immediate
desegregation of universities."' 93 Justice Tom Clark noted that although
desegregation of elementary schools could cause intense hostility, any
fear that ending segregation in college or graduate schools would pro-
voke defiance was unfounded. 19 4 At the level of higher education, "the
192. See generally McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (Black
graduate student was compelled to sit apart in an alcove separated from his White class-
mates); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (Texas did not offer Blacks legal education
that was equivalent to that of Whites). Sweatt was argued by Thurgood Marshall, and he
also participated in the preparation of the McLaurin brief.
193. Mark V. Tushnet, Remarks at Brown v. Board of Education and Its Legacy: A
Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall 30 (Mar. 24, 1992) (transcript on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (article based on speech included in this issue of the Fordham Law
Review).
194. Tushnet, with Lezin, supra note 27, at 1891.
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forces of progress in the South" were already at work.' 95
Those forces were hardly precipitate in Mississippi; it was not until
twenty years later that race-neutral policies were adopted196 at the state's
eight public colleges and universities. 9 7 This adoption had little impact
on the percentages of Black students attending the formerly all-White
institutions,' and it failed to ward off a lawsuit by private plaintiffs
charging that the schools had maintained the segregative effects of their
prior dual educational system. 199 Eventually, however, the State's efforts
were approved by a district court after trial and by the en banc Fifth
Circuit.2co
Universities were so different in character from primary schools, the
court of appeals reasoned, that many of the responsibilities described in
Green did not apply."0' A student's decision to go to college is a matter
of choice rather than a product of the compulsory education law gov-
erning the lower grades. 2 Mississippi does not assign students to a par-
ticular institution, and these institutions are "not fungible." 3  The
common tools of desegregation such as busing and zoning are irrelevant.
195. See iL
196. See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2733 n.2, 2735-36, 2737 (1992). In
1981, Mississippi reorganized its public universities by issuing "Mission Statements." See
id at 2733. The universities were divided into three categories: "comprehensive, urban,
and regional." Id The "comprehensive" group included the University of Mississippi,
Mississippi State, and Southern Mississippi-those having the greatest resources. See id.
The only "urban" university was Jackson State; it was given a limited mission. See id.
The "regional" universities included Delta State, Mississippi University for Women, Al-
corn State, and Mississippi Valley. See id Their mission was to serve as undergraduate
institutions. See id.
197. Mississippi's public university system began in 1848 with the establishment of the
White-only University of Mississippi. See id. at 2732. Twenty-three years later, the State
opened Alcorn State University to educate Blacks. See id. By 1925, four more exclu-
sively White facilities were added: Mississippi State University (1880), Mississippi Uni-
versity for Women (1885), University of Southern Mississippi (1912), and Delta State
University (1925). See id The State had a total of eight universities after opening two
more schools for Blacks: Jackson State University (1940) and Mississippi Valley State
University (1950). See id It was not until 1962 that the first Black student was admitted
to the University of Mississippi, pursuant to a court proceeding. See Meredith v. Fair,
306 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828, enforced per curiam, 313 F.2d 532
(5th Cir. 1962) (en banc), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 916 (1963).
198. See Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2733.
199. In 1975, the original plaintiffs alleged that Mississippi "maintained the racially
segregative effects of its prior dual system.., in violation of the Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth,
and Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d." See id. The United States intervened as plain-
tiff, "charging that State officials had failed to satisfy their obligation under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI." Id. The parties at-
tempted for twelve years to reach a resolution. The universities remained segregated,
and, by 1987, the parties still disagreed on whether the State had fulfilled its obligation to
end de jure segregation. See id. at 2734.
200. See id. at 2735.
201. See id. at 2736.
202. See id
203. See id.; supra note 196.
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Thus, neutral policies alone should be sufficient to wipe out the prior de
jure status.2 4
The Supreme Court disagreed, producing a decision in which causa-
tion was broadly defined and local autonomy was narrowly construed.
Its analysis and disapproval of Mississippi's admissions procedure illus-
trates this point.
The State had urged that there was no connection between its past and
present policies because it had replaced racial admissions criteria with an
objective test devised by an independent organization, the American Col-
lege Testing Program ("ACT").20 5 This plea failed to win over a single
Justice. Noting that the test was originally instituted for a racially dis-
criminatory purpose, was being employed in an inappropriate manner,
and was continuing to cause the same segregative patterns, the Court
held that the State had not yet met its burden of demonstrating that
changing the testing policy would erode sound educational goals.
20 6
Nor was the Court favorably impressed by the array of choices the
State offered to college applicants. "Unnecessary" program duplication
of non-core subjects at the various institutions, 2 7 combined with "waste-
ful and irrational" maintenance of eight universities (some quite close to
each other)208 all stemmed from Mississippi's long-established dual sys-
tem. Recognizing that private decisions can be shaped by public policy,
Justice White's opinion for the majority directed the lower courts to de-
204. Essentially, the circuit court was embracing the Briggs dictum, see supra notes
104-05, instead of Green.
205. Mississippi's rule was that every resident under 21 who applied to the university
system must take the ACT test. The score obtained guaranteed either automatic accept-
ance or rejection, but the minimum score required for success differed according to which
institution was doing the selecting. The cut-offs were higher for the flagship historically
White universities, and it was known that on the average, Black students scored too low
on the test to qualify. See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2738-40 (1992).
206. The Court pointed out that the test was never meant even by its creators to be
adequate as a sole basis for admission, and that most states used it in conjunction with
other criteria. See id. at 2740. Justice Scalia also agreed that the use of the ACT require-
ments should be reviewed, but dissented on other aspects of the Court's decision, includ-
ing its broad causation language. See id. at 2746-49; infra notes 210 and 213.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence strongly endorsed the majority's hard look at the facts,
noting that the lower courts must examine the State's "proffered justifications . . . to
ensure that such rationales do not merely mask the perpetuation of discriminatory prac-
tices." Fordice, 112 U.S. at 2744. Easy acceptance of these justifications would lead to
further loss of "educational and career opportunities." Id. at 2743-44.
207. See id. at 2740-41. The district court had concluded that " 'there is no proof that
the elimination of unnecessary program duplication would be justifiable from an educa-
tional standpoint or that its elimination would have a substantial effect on student
choice.'" Id. at 2741 (quoting the district court opinion, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1561 (N.D.
Miss. 1987)). The Supreme Court was critical of this conclusion on two grounds. The
lower court had in effect conceded lack of educational justification by finding that dupli-
cation was unnecessary and " 'cannot be justified economically or in terms of providing
quality education.'" Id. (quoting the district court opinion, 674 F.Supp. at 1541). More-
over, the district court appeared to be erroneously placing the burden of proof on plain-
tiffs to establish that Mississippi had not dismantled its prior dual system. See id.
208. See id. at 2742-43.
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termine whether this duplication itself affects student choice and perpetu-
ates the segregated higher education system.' 9 The proliferation of
institutions with similar curricula could-in combination with other fac-
tors-influence Black students not to seek admission to a traditionally
all-White school.21°
The "duplication" issue had controversial implications for the histori-
cally Black colleges. Should they all be retained, and perhaps be funded
as fully as the White institutions,2 ' or should one or more be eliminated?
The majority charted a careful course, observing that "[e]limination of
program duplication and revision of admissions criteria may make insti-
tutional closure unnecessary." '2 12 Separate-but-equal funding was re-
jected, but the possibility of approving a monetary increase "to achieve a
full dismantlement" was left for consideration on remand.213
The Court's penetrating look at the facts, its refusal to assume that
time alone can break the chain of causation, and its insistence on desegre-
gative results are reminiscent of Justice Marshall's opinions. If he had
remained on the bench, Marshall would have concurred "wholeheart-
edly" '214 with the majority's skepticism about the "free" choice being of-
fered to Mississippi students and with the rejection of an equal-but-
separate compromise. Professor J. Clay Smith, Jr., who had filed a brief
in the case on behalf of a group of Black colleges and the Congressional
Black Caucus, approved the tone and breadth of the decision, conclud-
209. See id at 2742. What are the differences and similarities between the state-
affected choices in Freeman and those in Fordice? The fundamental distinction is that at
the elementary school level, parents are selecting a residence because the school comes
with it, while at the university level the choice is among types of institutions. Still, there
is a similarity in both situations: official policies that have deliberately created racially
identifiable schools also have an impact on the "free" decision-maker.
210. The majority was apparently referring to the combination of traditional attend-
ance patterns at schools with a long history of racial exclusion, the "missions" attached
to the various schools, and admissions criteria, as having the potential to change appli-
cant choices. Justice Scalia's dissent on this aspect of the majority's decision indicates
that he would have agreed that policies restricting decisions could be suspect. Policies
expanding choices through proliferation of same-race schools would not be suspect, re-
gardless of the State's prior history. See id. at 2747.
211. This was a course that the private plaintiffs apparently favored. See id. at 2743.
212. Id. Justice Thomas concluded that these colleges had "sustained blacks during
segregation," and that it would therefore be ironic to destroy them in an effort to combat
segregation's vestiges. See id at 2746.
213. See id at 2743. Justice Scalia commented that "whether or not the Court's antag-
onism to unintegrated schooling is good policy, it is assuredly not good constitutional
law." Id. at 2752. He reasoned that the Constitution neither requires nor prohibits the
government from maintaining mostly-Black and mostly-White schools (which do not ex-
clude applicants on racial grounds) and giving them equal funding. See id.
214. This was a phrase Justice Marshall used in his Milliken 11 concurrence, expres-
sing his complete accord with the majority's holding that the damage inflicted by state-
enforced racial separation must be remedied by extensive compensatory measures. See
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring) (Milliken I1);
supra notes 116-17, 134 and accompanying text.
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ing: "The spirit of Thurgood Marshall lives on in this Court." '215
CONCLUSION
"I continue to believe that an individual's interest in education is fun-
damental," Justice Marshall wrote, "and that this view is amply sup-
ported 'by the unique status accorded public education by our society,
and by the close relationship between education and some of our most
basic constitutional values.' ,,216 In his hierarchy, learning ranked with
voting, speech, and religion as a right entitled to the highest level of legal
protection.
His dissents did not call for "racial balancing," although he recognized
that allowing metropolitan regions to be divided into "two cities-one
white, the other black- - 2 7 could have dangerous economic and social
consequences. Instead, he dealt with injury and causation issues, with
the effects of publicly sponsored discrimination and the feasible measures
that could eliminate those effects.
One of the two desegregation decisions issued since Marshall's retire-
ment showed distinct traces of this analysis. The other evidenced a read-
iness to decamp from the field that has been more characteristic of the
current majority.218 From some twenty-first century vantage point, Jus-
tice Marshall's dissents may be read only as a reflection of earlier atti-
tudes. Or, with another change in the Court's direction, they may form
the basis for a new majority view. After all, "[d]issenters (whether the
Marshalls or the Scalias) hope to become like Holmes and Brandeis-
prophets vindicated by the future, dissenters who became great prophets
because (indeed, only because) they were vindicated by history. 219
215. Linda Greenhouse, Court, 8-1, Faults Mississippi on Bias in College System, N.Y.
Times, June 27, 1992, at Al, A11.
216. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting from
his prior dissent in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 111 (1973)).
Plyler struck down a statute that precluded the children of illegal aliens from attending
public schools, noting that even if the educational right at stake was not fundamental, it
was important enough to require that the State show a substantial interest served by the
discrimination. See id. at 223-24, 227. The Court has left unsettled the question of
"whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right" that a state cannot
infringe on a discriminatory basis without triggering "heightened equal protection re-
view." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986).
217. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 815 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
218. See supra Parts II.C. and III.A.
219. Paul Gewirtz, Tribute: Thurgood Marshall, 101 Yale L.J. 13, 17-18 (1991).
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